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ESSAY
Chevron Is a Phoenix
Lisa Schultz Bressman*
Kevin M. Stack**
Judicial deference to agency interpretations of their own statutes is a
foundational principle of the administrative state. It recognizes that Congress
has the need and desire to delegate the details of regulatory policy to agencies
rather than specify those details or default to judicial determinations. It also
recognizes that interpretation under regulatory statutes is intertwined with
implementation of those statutes. Prior to the famous decision in Chevron, the
Supreme Court had long regarded judicial deference as a foundational
principle of administrative law. It grew up with the administrative state
alongside other foundational administrative law principles. In Chevron, the
Court gave judicial deference a particular articulation and set of express
justifications that made the principle seem new and bold—and ultimately set it
on a path to become convoluted and vulnerable. But judicial deference is no less
a foundational principle because Chevron took on a life of its own. And
foundational principles—particularly those that help to maintain balance
among the branches—do not simply go away. They change and reappear in the
law. The Court can try to kill Chevron, but judicial deference will find its way
back to administrative law.
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INTRODUCTION
Whether or not the Supreme Court overrules Chevron,1 judicial
deference to administrative agencies will persist in roughly the same
form. Some current Supreme Court Justices want to overrule Chevron.2
While Chevron has its problems, overruling the decision, we believe,
will have little effect on the deference courts give to agencies for
interpretations of their own statutes. Judicial deference is a
foundational principle of administrative law. Perhaps more
importantly, judicial deference is a foundational principle of the
administrative state. Such foundational principles establish the
balance of the branches in our governmental system and, as experience
shows, are difficult to dislodge. When one doctrine becomes unavailable
to maintain the equilibrium, another doctrine often arises to do the
work.3 Because the Court created Chevron, logic says that the Court can
take it away. But judicial deference has the resilience of any
foundational principle of law in this area, whether administrative or
constitutional. Judicial deference will find its way back. The only
question is how. The Court can try to kill Chevron, but it will rise from
the ashes like a phoenix.4
I. CHEVRON’S ORIGINS
The Court has long regarded judicial deference to agency
interpretations as a foundational principle of administrative law,
1.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2.
See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2432 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., joined by Thomas,
Alito & Kavanaugh, JJ., dissenting) (The APA’s “unqualified command requires the court to
determine legal questions—including questions about a regulation’s meaning—by its own lights,
not by those of political appointees or bureaucrats who may even be self-interested litigants in the
case at hand.”); Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 761–62 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing
that Chevron undermines Article III by transferring interpretive authority from courts to agencies
and also violates Article I by requiring courts to ignore unconstitutional delegations of lawmaking
power from Congress to agencies); see also Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Our Illiberal
Administrative State, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 475, 498 (2016) (“Chevron deference transfers the
judicial function to executive agencies based upon false premises about congressional intent.”);
Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187, 1206 (2016) (“[W]hen judges
acquiesce in Chevron deference, they unconstitutionally abandon their very office as judges.”).
3.
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“When one legal
doctrine becomes unavailable to do its intended work, the hydraulic pressures of our constitutional
system sometimes shift the responsibility to different doctrines.”), reh’g denied, 140 S. Ct.
570 (2019).
4.
Phoenix, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989):
In classical mythology: a bird resembling an eagle but with sumptuous red and gold
plumage, which was said to live for five or six hundred years in the deserts of Arabia,
before burning itself to ashes on a funeral pyre ignited by the sun and fanned by its own
wings, only to rise from its ashes with renewed youth to live through another such cycle.

2021]

CHEVRON IS A PHOENIX

467

developing it in much the same way and at much the same time as other
foundational principles that developed along with the administrative
state. Chevron obscured these roots by expressing judicial deference in
its own terms—and in so doing, set itself on a trajectory that ended up
jeopardizing its own existence. Briefly retracing the history of judicial
deference in administrative law highlights how deeply the principle is
entrenched there, independent from the articulation in—and the
ultimate fate of—the Chevron decision itself.
The doctrine that a reviewing court must leave interpretive
judgments to the agency appeared well before Chevron, and well before
the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Skidmore
v. Swift & Co. illustrates this point.5 Skidmore is known for the
proposition that courts must give agency interpretations persuasive but
not controlling weight in their own judicial interpretations.6 But what
prompted the Court to articulate this standard of judicial review was
that the conventional standard—the one that would eventually find its
way to Chevron—was not applicable. The Court was in need of a
framework for determining the weight of an agency’s views when
Congress had not granted the agency power to engage in lawmaking.
The Court, explaining the circumstances it confronted in Skidmore,
wrote: “Congress did not utilize the services of an administrative agency
to find facts and to determine in the first instance whether particular
cases fall within or without the Act.” 7 The Court dwelt on this contrast:
“The rulings of this Administrator are not reached as a result of hearing
adversary proceedings in which he finds facts from evidence and
reaches conclusions of law from findings of fact. They are
not . . . conclusive, even in the cases with which they directly deal . . . .”8
The Court made clear that this would have been a different case if the
Administrator had been granted power to reach conclusions by
adversarial hearing. In that case, the Administrator’s judgments would
be “conclusive,” that is, “controlling upon the courts by reason of
their authority.”9
As famous as Skidmore has become by virtue of its persuasivebut-not-controlling-weight standard, a less-known case decided shortly
before makes the existence of the controlling deference standard even
5.
323 U.S. 134 (1944).
6.
Id. at 140 (“We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the
Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority,
do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance.”).
7.
Id. at 137.
8.
Id. at 139.
9.
Id. at 139–40.
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more evident. Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville
Broadcasting Co. affirms the idea that courts charged with judicial
review will treat an agency’s interpretation as conclusive unless the
agency makes an error of law.10 Pottsville Broadcasting does so by
sharply distinguishing the two ways in which Congress has used courts
in review of agency action. On the one hand, Congress has on occasion
vested the courts of appeals with the power to “alter or revise” an agency
decision “and enter such judgment as to it may seem just.” 11 In such a
circumstance, Congress vested the court with “administrative rather
than judicial” power, so that the court constituted “a superior and
revising agency in the same field.”12 Relevant to the case, when
Congress enacted the Radio Act of 1927, it placed the courts of appeals
in that “administrative” role for review of licensing decisions by the
Federal Communications Commission.13 On the other hand, and more
typically, Congress restricts courts to the role of “purely judicial
review.”14 When Congress revised the Radio Act of 1927, it moved to
this model.15 The role of “purely judicial review” confined courts to
decide only questions familiar to them:
Whether the [C]ommission applies the legislative standards validly set up, whether it acts
within the authority conferred or goes beyond it, whether its proceedings satisfy the
pertinent demands of due process, whether, in short, there is compliance with the legal
requirements which fix the province of the [C]ommission and govern its action, are
appropriate questions for judicial decision. 16

Subject to review of such “errors of law,” enforcing “the legislative policy
is committed to [the agency’s] charge.”17
In view of this form of judicial review, the Pottsville
Broadcasting Court concluded that the order in which license
applications are reviewed—a question of statutory interpretation to

10. 309 U.S. 134, 145 (1940).
11. Id. at 144 (quoting the Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 16, 44 Stat. 1169 (amended 1930)
(repealed 1934)).
12. Id. (quoting Fed. Radio Comm’n v. Gen. Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464, 467 (1930)).
13. See id.
Under the Radio Act of 1927 as originally passed, the Court of Appeals was authorized
in reviewing action of the Radio Commission to “alter or revise the decision appealed
from and enter such judgment as to it may seem just.” Thereby the Court of Appeals
was constituted “a superior and revising agency in the same field” as that in which the
Radio Commission acted.
(citation omitted).
14. Id.
15. Id. (citing the Radio Act of 1927, ch. 788, § 16, 46 Stat. 844 (repealed 1934)).
16. Id. at 144–45 (quoting Fed. Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Brothers Bond & Mortg. Co., 289
U.S. 266, 276 (1933)).
17. Id. at 145.
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which Congress had not spoken—was not for the Court to decide.18 “The
Court of Appeals cannot write the principle of priority into the statute
as an indirect result of its power to scrutinize legal errors . . . .”19
Rather, the agency was to decide whether such a priority rule would
serve the statutory standard of “public convenience, interest, or
necessity” that applied to licensing decisions, which was the agency’s
“responsibility at all times.”20 Pottsville Broadcasting thus reflects the
same fundamental allocation of lawmaking authority reported in
Skidmore: when the agency had been delegated authority either to
conduct adjudications or make rules, its determinations, even those
involving interpretive judgments, were entitled to controlling weight
or “leeway.”21
Following the enactment of the APA in 1946, the Court
continued to adhere to the basic proposition that when Congress has
charged an agency with administration of a statute, the task of the
reviewing court is narrow.22 To sustain the agency’s judgment, the court
“need not find that [the agency’s] construction is the only reasonable
one or even that it is the result we would have reached had the question
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113,
200 (1998) (quoting Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 643 (1986)) (describing a long line of
Supreme Court decisions before and after the enactment of the APA that interpret statutory
rulemaking authorizations as providing leeway for agencies to interpret statutory texts in the first
instance without interference from courts); Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s
Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1159 (2012)
(explaining that pre-APA law, reflected in NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944),
involved courts defining the scope of the space of agency interpretation, but within that space
deferring to agencies). The articulation of the standard of review in such decisions is clear and
forceful. See, e.g., Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 397–98 (1943) (“We think that in the
circumstances of this case the administrative construction in effect at the time of the receipt of the
stock dividends here in issue must be given controlling effect.”); Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. at 131
(“[W]here the question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in
which the agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court’s
function is limited.”); Unemployment Comp. Comm’n of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153 (1946)
(“To sustain the Commission’s application of this statutory term, we need not find that its
construction is the only reasonable one or even that it is the result we would have reached had the
question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings.”).
22. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11 (1965) (“The interpretation expressly placed on a
statute by those charged with its administration must be given weight by courts faced with the
task of construing the statute.”); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969) (“[T]he
construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there are
compelling indications that it is wrong, especially when Congress has refused to alter the
administrative construction.” (footnote omitted)); United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 553
(1979) (“[T]he construction of a statute by those charged with its administration is entitled to
substantial deference.”); accord United States v. Alexander, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 177, 179–81 (1870)
(deferring to a reasonable statutory interpretation offered by the Commissioner of Pensions rather
than reinterpreting the statute).
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arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings.” 23 That standard,
articulated in relation to a question of the “specific application of a
broad statutory term,”24 was adopted as a general framework for
judicial review of agency actions involving interpretive issues, creating
a solid line of precedent repeatedly cited and relied on by the Court.25
Indeed, just several years prior to the decision in Chevron, the Court
reiterated that when faced with an agency’s construction of a statute
that the agency administers, the court’s job is a “narrower inquiry into
whether the [agency’s] construction was ‘sufficiently reasonable’ to be
accepted by a reviewing court,” which does not require the agency’s
position be the “only reasonable one”26 or even the interpretation the
court would have adopted if the question had reached it first.27 The
respect for reasonable constructions by agencies made those
constructions conclusive or controlling. As the Court emphasized in its
1965 decisions in Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and
Udall v. Tallman, an interpretation found to be “sufficiently

23. Aragon, 329 U.S. at 153.
24. Id.
25. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965):
When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great deference
to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its
administration. “To sustain the Commission’s application of this statutory term, we
need not find that its construction is the only reasonable one or even that it is the result
we would have reached had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial
proceedings.”
(citing Aragon, 329 U.S. at 153); Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 87 (1975):
We therefore conclude that the Agency’s interpretation of §§ 110(a)(3) and 110(f) was
“correct,” to the extent that it can be said with complete assurance that any particular
interpretation of a complex statute such as this is the “correct” one. Given this
conclusion, as well as the facts that the Agency is charged with administration of the
Act, and that there has undoubtedly been reliance upon its interpretation by the States
and other parties affected by the Act, we have no doubt whatever that its construction
was sufficiently reasonable to preclude the Court of Appeals from substituting its
judgment for that of the Agency.
(citing Udall, 380 U.S. at 16–18); FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27,
39 (1981):
Hence, in determining whether the Commission’s action was “contrary to law,” the task
for the Court of Appeals was not to interpret the statute as it thought best but rather
the narrower inquiry into whether the Commission’s construction was “sufficiently
reasonable” to be accepted by a reviewing court. To satisfy this standard it is not
necessary for a court to find that the agency’s construction was the only reasonable one
or even the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in
a judicial proceeding.
(citing Train, 421 U.S. at 75; Udall, 380 U.S. at 16; Aragon, 329 U.S. at 153).
26. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. at 39.
27. Id.
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reasonable” would “preclude the Court of Appeals from substituting its
judgment for that of the Agency.”28
This background law of deference played a role in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s
consideration of the substantive question in Chevron—whether the
“bubble,” or plant-wide, interpretation of “stationary source” in the
Clean Air Act was permissible for areas of the country that did not meet
federal air quality standards.29 Prior to the consideration of the Chevron
appeal, the D.C. Circuit had twice held that the bubble interpretation
of “stationary source” was permissible for maintaining—but not for
enhancing—air quality, stating, if not correctly applying, the
background law of deference.30 As the D.C. Circuit observed in the first
of those decisions, ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA,31 the scope of “judicial review
of EPA’s regulations interpreting the Clean Air Act is defined in Section
10(e) [codified as section 706] of the Administrative Procedure Act,”32
quoting the “decide all relevant questions of law” and other related
language of section 706.33 But, as the D.C. Circuit in ASARCO was
careful to note, those provisions did not foreclose deference to the
agency’s interpretation. Far from it. “[T]he Supreme Court and this
court have both stated that EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act is
to be given considerable deference.”34 Such deference is the standard
that the Supreme Court articulated many times before, including in
Train: the reviewing court has the responsibility “to examine carefully
the words of the statute, the legislative history, and the reasons
advanced by the agency to justify its interpretation in order to
determine whether the agency’s interpretation is ‘sufficiently
reasonable that it should (be) accepted by the reviewing courts.’ ”35
Perhaps misapplying that standard, the D.C. Circuit rejected the
bubble interpretation of stationary source.36
In the litigation of the Chevron case itself, the D.C. Circuit could
not assess, under the reasonableness standard of review articulated in
28. Train, 421 U.S. at 87 (citing Udall, 380 U.S. at 16–18).
29. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev’d sub nom.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
30. ASARCO Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319, 325–26 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 325 (quoting section 706, under which a reviewing court is to “decide all relevant
questions of law, interpret . . . statutory provisions, and . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right . . . .”).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 326–27 (quoting Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 75 (1975)).
36. Id. at 329.
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Train, whether to allow the EPA to adopt the “bubble” interpretation of
stationary source for areas not currently in compliance with federal air
standards because its own precedent in ASARCO precluded that
conclusion.37 The Supreme Court, of course, was not bound by the D.C.
Circuit’s prior constructions of the Clean Air Act and was free to restore
the basic law of judicial review under the APA that it had previously
established—namely, that a reviewing court should accept an agency’s
reasonable interpretation of the statute and not “substitut[e] its
judgment for that of the Agency.”38
The Court did exactly that, but in a way that ended up launching
Chevron on its own distinctive trajectory. Perhaps to make its message
clear to a sometimes recalcitrant D.C. Circuit, the Court broke down
the law of judicial deference into what seemed like easy-to-apply, hardto-evade steps: first, ask if Congress has spoken to the precise question
at issue, and if not, then accept the agency’s construction so long as it
is reasonable.39 In substance, the Court carried forward what was
already the law on judicial review of agency interpretations, as Justice
Stevens, the author of the opinion, long insisted.40 But it did not connect
this framework to the APA, notwithstanding the heavy citations and
footnotes in the decision. 41 Moreover, it gave the two-step test express
justifications—congressional delegation and the relative institutional
competence of courts and agencies42— that seemed to establish a standalone foundation. It also featured particular terminology for
congressional delegation—“explicit” and “implicit”—that created a
similar impression.
Once decided, Chevron was off and running. Justice Scalia joined
the Court the next term and turned Step One into a cottage industry.43
The decision, shorn from the prior law of judicial review, produced a

37. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 720 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“We
express no view on the decision we would reach if the line drawn in Alabama Power and ASARCO
did not control our judgment.”).
38. Train, 421 U.S at 87 (“[T]he Agency is charged with administration of the Act . . . [and]
we have no doubt whatever that its construction was sufficiently reasonable to preclude the Court
of Appeals from substituting its judgment for that of the Agency.”).
39. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
40. See JOHN PAUL STEVENS, THE MAKING OF A JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS ON MY FIRST 94 YEARS
202 (2019) (explaining that the case’s significance was not immediately clear to the Court); Thomas
W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW STORIES 398, 420 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006) (noting that Justice Stevens frequently
maintained that Chevron was just a statement of existing law).
41. 5 U.S.C. § 706. Chevron notoriously does not cite this APA provision. 467 U.S. at 837.
42. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.
43. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 520–21 (“How clear is clear? It is here [at Step One], if Chevron is not abandoned,
that the future battles over acceptance of agency interpretations of law will be fought.”).
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steady stream of specifications and adornments. Does this Chevronstyle review apply when the agency lacks a general grant of rulemaking
authority or has not exercised that authority (Mead)?44 Does Chevron
apply when Congress delegates authority to resolve so-called major
questions of great economic or political significance (Brown &
Williamson)?45 Do agency interpretations trump a prior judicial
interpretation of the same statutory language (Brand X)?46 Does
Chevron apply when multiple agencies have been vested with
rulemaking power?47 And so on. One judicial decision issued with little
fanfare in 1984 became the fount for this entire multifaceted, nuanced
doctrinal artifice. It also became the most cited decision of
administrative law.48 Although Justice Stevens did not foresee
Chevron’s prominent status, the Court certainly cultivated it.
As the scheme became intricate, it also became a flash point for
disagreement. Justice Scalia’s views proliferated in number and
intensified in tone. Justice Breyer’s voice often provided an equally
forceful counterweight. Other Justices joined in with their own strongly
worded opinions. Meanwhile, administrative law scholars fanned the
flames, writing article upon article about what the Chevron framework
did to the law.
Now the debate among some Justices and scholars is whether
Chevron’s run has come to end. To detractors, Chevron’s framework is
nothing short of disaster. Congressional delegation has run amok,
executive authority is out of whack, and lower courts are just plain

44. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231–32 (2001) (declining to apply Chevron
unless Congress has delegated to the agency the authority to issue interpretations with the force
of law, and the agency has used that authority).
45. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) (quoting Stephen
G. Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986)) (“A
court may also ask whether the legal question is an important one. Congress is more likely to have
focused upon, and answered, major questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer
themselves in the course of the statute’s daily administration.”).
46. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (“A
court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to
Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the
unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”).
47. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 146 (1991)
(determining which of two agencies that jointly implement a regulatory statute possesses
delegated lawmaking authority to issue Chevron-worthy interpretations of the statute).
48. Chevron has had pride of place for a long while. See Peter M. Shane & Christopher J.
Walker, Foreward: Chevron at 30: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475,
475 (2014) (“Chevron has been cited in over 68,000 total sources available on Westlaw . . . .”);
Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An Empirical Assessment, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 703 (2014) (discussing the thousands of articles, opinions, and briefs written
concerning and citing Chevron in the decades following the decision).

474

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:2:465

confused by the “dispersion” of judicial responsibility.49 Questions of law
are for courts to resolve, yet Chevron claims that role for agencies and
is cited in case after case for that strident proposition. To these critics,
Chevron must be overruled to correct the impression, if not the
actuality, that it justifies an abdication of judicial responsibility.
But these arguments neglect that Chevron carries forward a
fundamental principle of administrative law. Moreover, as we next
address, Chevron embodies a fundamental principle of the
administrative state. The centrality of judicial deference to the
administrative state ultimately means that it cannot be vanquished
simply by overruling Chevron, the decision.
II. CHEVRON’S PREMISE
Judicial deference will persist because it is the proper
counterpart to congressional delegation and statutory implementation
in our governmental system. At the most basic level, judicial deference
allows Congress to delegate implementation of a regulatory scheme to
an agency rather than resolving the granular issues itself or leaving
them to be sorted out by courts. In this sense, judicial deference is as
much a premise of regulatory government as congressional delegation
itself. When courts wind up resolving the granular issues that Congress
has left to agencies, something is amiss as far as regulatory statutes are
concerned and designed. This is not a defense of judicial deference or
congressional delegation, but an explanation of the connection. In the
administrative state, the connection between deference and delegation
is fundamental, which is what the Court recognized when it developed
its doctrines of review. If agencies are charged with statutory
implementation, then judicial deference to their interpretations is a
logical inference.
First consider what we know about Congress. Empirical studies
suggest that Chevron likely got the basis for judicial deference right—
namely, that Congress intends for agencies to resolve interpretive
questions and for courts to defer to agency resolutions. A survey of more
than one hundred congressional staffers who draft legislation—in both
the House and the Senate, across many committees, and from both
political parties—shows that Congress likely expects agencies to have
interpretive authority and views it as part of what comes with an
express delegation of lawmaking power. These staffers indicated that

49. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496–97 (2010)
(characterizing the constitutional problem with statutory dual layer for-cause removal restrictions
on agency officials as a “dispersion of responsibility”).
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they often draft against Chevron, which they take to mean that agencies
will resolve ambiguities in statutes.50 Moreover, the staffers often use
ambiguity deliberately, not inadvertently.51 They rely on legislative
history to communicate with agencies about implementation,52 which is
important because it suggests that they do not always use the text of
the statute to say everything that they mean. And they aim for agencies,
not courts, to be the ones to resolve issues in regulatory statutes.53
When courts end up resolving ambiguities that arise, something has
gone wrong. Another empirical study, this time from the agency side,
shows that these messages are not lost on agencies. 54 Agency drafters
read statutes as Congress intends them to.
Although the studies are not conclusive on the relationship
between congressional delegation and judicial deference, what they
suggest about that relationship is powerful. Congress seeks to delegate
interpretive authority to agencies and expects courts to defer. The
Court has been right all along about the connection between
congressional delegation and judicial deference. Chevron attempted a
clear articulation of the connection, and, ironically, its particular
characterization led some to question the validity of its premise. 55 But
that is a Chevron problem, not a problem with the premise that

50. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 901, 995 (2013) (“Of [ ] respondents, 82% were familiar with Chevron.”); id. at 996 (“Eighty
respondents (58%) said that Chevron plays a role when they are drafting.”). Even if the Court
overrules Chevron, these findings are still important as to the multitude of statutes enacted before
that time and still requiring interpretation after. See also Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter,
The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 601 (2002)
(noting that staffers for the Senate Judiciary Committee volunteered several interpretive
principles, including the Chevron doctrine).
51. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 50, at 997 (“Almost half of [ ] respondents (45%)
expressed agreement with the statement that the deference rules allow drafters to leave statutory
terms ambiguous because they know that agencies can fill the gaps.”).
52. Id. at 1014 (“Ninety-four percent of [ ] respondents [explained] that the purpose of
legislative history is to shape the way that agencies interpret statutes, and 21% separately
described legislative history as a mechanism of agency oversight.” (footnote omitted)).
53. Id. at 997 (showing that when asked, congressional staffers explained a predominant view
that Chevron permits agencies rather than courts to interpret statutory ambiguities); see also Kent
Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 33–36 (2015) (arguing that “Dodd-Frank’s
provisions [codifying the standards of judicial review] suggest that Congress . . . uses Chevron as
a background norm when drafting.”).
54. Using the survey of congressional legislative drafters developed by Bressman and Gluck,
Christopher Walker surveyed agency rule drafters. His study revealed similar results. The
majority of agency rule drafters surveyed understand that when Congress does not specify a
particular statutory goal, it intends for agencies, rather than courts, to make final determinations.
Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1055 (2015).
55. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 562 n.51 (2009)
(collecting articles).
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undergirds regulatory statutes and prior cases. Judicial deference is the
norm, and de novo judicial interpretation is the aberration.
The idea that Congress intends to delegate authority to agencies,
without resolving detailed issues itself or leaving those issues for
courts, is also evident from the regulatory statutes that Congress
enacts. The whole nature of regulatory statutes makes interpretation a
routine, intrinsic part of implementation in two overlapping senses.
First, regulatory statutes do not expressly divide interpretive and
implementation issues, parceling some off for judicial elaboration and
leaving others for the agency. They give implementation issues to the
agency, and those issues regularly require interpretation. Second,
regulatory statutes do not treat the task of interpretation as distinct
from the task of implementation. They prompt interpretive questions
that depend for resolution on how the agency implements them. 56
Consider the issue in Chevron: the meaning of “stationary
source” in the Clean Air Act for areas that did not meet federal air
quality standards.57 No doubt that this phrase required
“interpretation.” The EPA was deciding whether to apply the same
definition to the dirtiest areas of the country as it did to cleaner areas.
But the interpretive question undeniably depended on facts and
judgments, some the product of experience and some the result of
political change. The EPA did not interpret the phrase and then
implement it; rather, the agency interpreted the phrase by
implementing it.
There is nothing exceptional in this relationship between
interpretation and implementation. It is akin to saying that regulatory
statutes require agencies to sort out “mixed questions of law and fact.”58
When an agency is determining the meaning of an ambiguous term, it
56. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency-Centered or Court-Centered Administrative Law? A
Dialogue with Richard Pierce on Agency Statutory Interpretation, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 889, 898
(2007) (explaining that the “notion that policy choice is not interpretive simply ignores many of
the necessary mental operations involved in administrative implementation”).
57. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).
58. See NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 130–31 (1944):
In making [the Board’s] determinations as to the facts in these matters conclusive, if
supported by evidence, Congress entrusted to it primarily the decision whether the
evidence establishes the material facts. Hence in reviewing the Board’s ultimate
conclusions, it is not the court’s function to substitute its own inferences of fact for the
Board’s, when the latter have support in the record. . . . But where the question is one
of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency
administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court’s function is
limited. . . . [T]he Board’s determination . . . under this Act is to be accepted if it has
“warrant in the record” and a reasonable basis in law.
(citations omitted); see also Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir.
1976) (“[G]reat deference must be given to the decisions of an administrative agency applying a
statute to the facts and [ ] such decisions can be reversed only if without rational basis . . . .”).
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is making a mixed sort of judgment, with both the law part and the fact
part contingent on the other. The Court moved away from this
characterization by the time that it decided Chevron,59 as it had moved
away from other formal descriptions of allocated institutional power in
regulatory statutes toward more functional ones.60 Regardless of the
particular framing, the Court has correctly recognized that judicial
deference accommodates the character of interpretation under
regulatory statutes. Why else would resolving statutory ambiguity
involve making “policy” as to which agency “expertise” is necessary
(and, of course, presidential “accountab[ility]” is beneficial), as the
Court expressed it in Chevron?61 Just as respect for the jury requires a
margin of appreciation for that body’s resolution of mixed questions, so
too a margin of appreciation is required when the agency is specifying
the meaning of an ambiguous aspect of a statute.
That does not mean courts have no role. Regulatory statutes do
not deprive courts of interpretive authority that is familiar to them—
resolving questions of what Congress required, prohibited, or did not
delegate at all in a statute. The foundational principle of judicial
deference that empirical studies confirm and common sense bears out
is not about transferring judicial responsibility to agencies.62 Rather, it
recognizes that de novo judicial review of every question that could be
characterized as interpretive does not fit with how Congress writes
regulatory statutes and how those statutes operate, nor could it.
III. CHEVRON’S ASHES
Judicial deference is a fixture of the administrative state, as the
Court understood well before Chevron eclipsed its own origins. Whether
Chevron survives or not, judicial deference will persist because fixtures

59. See Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking
Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 224 (1992) (noting that Chevron makes a distinction
between law and policy, not law and fact).
60. Compare Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (using categories of
quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative power to evaluate the constitutionality of a statutory removal
restriction on an agency official), with Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (using a more
functional approach); compare Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (using categories of private
and public rights to evaluate the constitutionality of a statute delegating certain claims to nonArticle III courts), with Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (using
a more functional approach).
61. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66 (stating that interpretations of ambiguous statutory
language involve “policy choices” better left to accountable “political branches”).
62. As Peter Strauss writes, under Chevron, properly understood, the judicial role is to
independently decide “the limits of the authority Congress has conferred on the agency,” that is,
whether the agency’s action is ultra vires. Peter L. Strauss, A Softer, Simpler View of Chevron,
ADMIN. & REGUL. L. NEWS, Summer 2018, at 7.
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of the administrative state do not disappear from the law. They morph
and reappear out of their own ashes.
When the Court no longer enforces a foundational principle
through one doctrine, another doctrine often arises in its place.63 This
phenomenon is not new to the law and has loomed particularly large in
administrative law. When the Court did not enforce the nondelegation
doctrine to keep Congress from passing power to agencies in extremely
broad terms, the concerns about such broad transfers—concerns for
congressional responsibility and agency accountability—did not simply
disappear. These concerns, instead, found an alternative outlet in the
law—in fact, more than one outlet.64 For example, the Court has used
the constitutional avoidance canon to effectively rewrite a particular
statute in a way that addresses nondelegation concerns about agency
authority under that statute.65 Nondelegation concerns did not vanish
with the demise of the nondelegation doctrine; they just found
expression elsewhere.66
Similar dynamics are at work with judicial deference. If
Congress can delegate authority to agencies, subject to only limited
constraints, then judicial deference is necessary to ensure that agencies
can exercise their delegated authority. Congressional delegation and
judicial deference go hand-in-hand. If the Court were to get rid of
judicial deference in one swoop by overruling Chevron, the entire U.S.
corpus of regulatory statutes, with broad delegations, would remain on
the books. What happens then? Some form of judicial deference will
recur. The grounds that animate judicial deference (agencies, not
courts, should make the basic choices of regulatory policy) will not go
away any less than the worries that underlie the nondelegation doctrine
(that Congress, not agencies, should make the overarching law) have.

63. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2141–42 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (noting
the shift from the nondelegation doctrine to the major questions doctrine “to rein in Congress’s
efforts to delegate legislative power”).
64. Id.
65. See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639–43 (1980)
(interpreting narrowly a statutory grant of agency authority to avoid a constitutional
nondelegation issue). Likewise, the Court created the major questions doctrine, which requires
Congress to make the significant choices of regulatory policy rather than delegating those decisions
to agencies. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015). Similarly, Mead requires Congress
to decide whether an agency has lawmaking authority at all, rather than allowing courts to
presume it. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
66. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315–16 (2000)
(“[The nondelegation doctrine] has been relocated rather than abandoned.”); John F. Manning, The
Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 223 (explaining the
doctrine is used through the constitutional avoidance canon).
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Judicial deference is part of the “separation-of-powers triangle between
the legislative, executive, and judiciary.”67
Judicial deference is not foundational in the same way that the
nondelegation doctrine or other underenforced separation-of-powers
norms are—Chevron is not a constitutional decision. But its
constitutional status does not matter. What matters is it reflects an
arrangement fundamental to our current structure of government.
To see the point in the most practical terms, just consider the
position of reviewing courts. In the immediate aftermath of a decision
overruling Chevron, lower courts will feel pressure—they will face a
new demand to choose the best interpretation for every statutory
provision implicated in every agency decision. But given the complexity
of statutory schemes, the specialized expertise and experience that
implementing those schemes requires, and the sheer number of routine
interpretive issues that the schemes involve, courts will confront the
natural fault lines of their own competence as generalists and lawyers.
They will have every incentive to find a way out.
That way will have to involve a different form of judicial
deference. Reviewing courts unable to explicitly invoke Chevron
deference will begin to characterize agency statutes and agency
interpretations differently. For example, they might find more express
delegations of interpretive power to agencies, placing them beyond the
Chevron default, but still requiring controlling deference.68 Or they
might reject a litigant’s characterization of the flaws in an agency action
as interpretive and instead view them as a matter of policymaking
discretion. Either way, courts will default to or persist in deferring to
agencies on routine issues, just using a different label or different
characterization of the issues to do so. This prediction is not fanciful.
After Mead was decided, lower courts were uncertain which procedures
confer lawmaking authority on agencies and quickly found workarounds.69 The pressure will be even greater to find a work-around

67. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2142 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Nor have we abandoned enforcing
other sides of the separation-of-powers triangle between the legislative, executive, and
judiciary. . . . [W]hen the separation of powers is at stake, we don’t just throw up our hands.”).
68. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984):
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation
of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.
Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute;
Mead, 533 U.S. at 227 (noting that whenever there is an express delegation to the agency, the
agency’s ensuring regulation “is binding in the courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or
capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute”).
69. Id.; see Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443 (2005) (collecting and analyzing cases).
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given the mismatch between the capacity of courts and the complexity
of regulatory policymaking. The operational details typically and
understandably fall outside of the judicial ken. And so judicial deference
will return.
Judicial deference might reemerge in other, more explicit ways.
Even if the Supreme Court overrules Chevron, it could still recognize
the need for a more modest, moderate form of judicial deference. There
is nothing inconsistent in wishing to be done with the elaborate, multifaceted, nuanced artifice that is Chevron and offering a version of
judicial deference that is closer to its roots. The Court might determine
that Chevron is no longer a viable method for handling interpretive
issues because the framework is an unruly mess and creates the
misimpression that judicial deference justifies judicial abdication.
Nevertheless, the Court might still acknowledge that judicial deference
is necessary, and not only because of the plight of lower courts and the
sheer number of interpretive issues in regulatory statutes. Judicial
deference is proper when viewed as a foundational principle of
administrative law, as explained in Part I. Judicial deference is proper
when considered in light of congressional design and statutory
structure, as shown in Part II. And so judicial deference might return
through another administrative law decision.
That new doctrine is not difficult to imagine. A natural way for
the Court to reunite judicial deference with its administrative law roots
is through an interpretation of the APA’s judicial review provision,
section 706. Although that section is not a model of clarity, it was
enacted in the context of judicial decisions that recognized the basic
structure of judicial review, and the Court might read it as a
congressional codification of judicial deference.70 It might seem too late
in the day (or the next century) to tie judicial deference back to the APA,
but the Court has not been shy about putting a gloss on the APA years
after its enactment. A case in point is State Farm, decided in 1983 and
elaborating arbitrary and capricious review.71 Chevron was decided a
year after State Farm and appeared to obviate the need for the Court to
70. See Strauss, supra note 21, at 1160 (arguing that the APA worked no necessary changes
in the bifurcated judicial role of primary review—“with courts deciding for themselves the possible
meanings of statutes allocating authority to agencies, but then, within that ‘space,’ accepting the
agency’s responsibility and policing its exercise for reasonableness”); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron
as Law, 107 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1652 (2019) (stating that section 706 declares the existing law
concerning “the scope of judicial review” and is a codification “of the principles of judicial review
embodied in many statutes and judicial decisions” (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 93, 108 (1947)); Kisor v. Wilkie, 139
S. Ct. 2400, 2419 (2019) (Kagan, J., plurality) (“Section 706 was understood when enacted to
‘restate[ ] the present law as to the scope of judicial review.’ ” (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 108 (1947))).
71. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
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connect judicial deference to the APA. If Chevron is gone, the Court
will have a new opportunity to revisit the APA’s connection to
judicial deference.
Reading the APA to contain a principle of judicial deference
might better serve the administrative state. The Court might then take
the occasion to explain carefully what that principle entails, as it has
with arbitrary and capricious review. If the Court reads the APA to
require judicial deference, it could seek to avoid the unnecessary
complexity of our current doctrine. It also could retain control of the
transition to the new regime, promoting predictability for reviewing
courts and consistency among them. If judicial deference emerges as an
elaboration of the APA, Congress, not the Court, would be the
acknowledged source for the standard of judicial review. That message
is significant for those annoyed by any suggestion in Chevron that the
Court does not want to do its job of interpreting statutes.
Of course, such a new judicial doctrine is improbable if the Court
announces that Chevron has deeper flaws, and the likely pattern will
be more varied, accumulated, and ad hoc. Lower courts would persist in
their efforts to avoid making difficult implementation choices,
gravitating, as they must, toward judicial deference. The Court would
have little choice but to decline review of anything other than the most
egregious examples of judicial deference in the lower courts. And if the
Court works harder to systematically impose its own interpretations on
regulatory statutes, it could even end up losing more control over
statutory interpretation as a general matter—provoking a response
from Congress to codify judicial deference more specifically by
amending the APA or otherwise.72 Congress has relied on Chevron in
drafting statutes and may express a mood of disagreement upon seeing
lower courts thrown into the role of ill-suited, decentralized interpreters
of regulatory statutes.
The claim that judicial deference will remain with or without
Chevron is not a claim about whether the legal and practical dimensions
of the administrative state, as they now exist, will remain. The Justices
who are willing to oust Chevron also are willing to reinvigorate the
nondelegation doctrine in direct constitutional form and to invalidate
72. See Barnett, supra note 53, at 4–7 (providing an overview of congressional reluctance to
provide guidance on the standard of review and examining implications of it doing so in DoddFrank). The Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016),
passed in the House but not the Senate of the 114th Congress, would require courts to review de
novo all agency interpretations of federal law, overruling Chevron. We see this as one among the
occasional instances of dissent from Congress’s long-term and persistent demand for judicial
deference to agencies on interpretive issues, which has been firmly entrenched since long before
Chevron. See Barnett, supra note 53, at 52 (noting difficulties faced in past attempts to codify a
general standard of review).
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broad regulatory statutes.73 We believe courts will find ways to avoid
striking down a vast swath of regulatory statutes, even if those Justices
succeed, but that is a story of another phoenix. Our claim here is that
even a dramatic overruling of Chevron will not eradicate judicial
deference to agency interpretations of regulatory statutes.
CONCLUSION
Judicial deference to agency interpretations of their own
statutes is a foundational principle of the administrative state. It
recognizes that Congress has the need and desire to delegate the details
of regulatory policy to agencies rather than to specify those details or
default to courts. It also recognizes that interpretation under regulatory
statutes is a fundamental part of implementation. The Court once
regarded judicial deference as a foundational principle of
administrative law. When Chevron came along, judicial deference
developed along a track that made it seem new and bold—and
ultimately convoluted and vulnerable. But judicial deference is no less
a foundational principle because Chevron took on a life of its own. And
foundational principles—particularly those that help to maintain
balance among the branches—do not simply go away. If the Court no
longer enforces them in a certain way, they often morph and reappear
in the law. Judicial deference is one such principle. It will persist in
administrative law for as long as the administrative state continues to
define our government.
Maybe the Court will overrule Chevron to do away with the
albatross some think the decision has become. But Chevron is a
phoenix, and phoenixes do not die. They rise from the ashes with
renewed vigor.

73. See, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131–48 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(reasoning the authority granted by SORNA poses a nondelegation issue).

